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SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
Eric De Brabandere* and David Holloway** 
 
I Introduction 
 
The sanctions enacted by the European Union (EU), the United States of America 
(US) and various other States in 2014 against several Russian individuals have 
sparked a debate amongst scholars and practitioners concerning the arbitration of 
disputes involving Russian parties or transactions targeted by the sanctions.1 Europe-
based arbitration institutions have likewise reacted to the imposition of sanctions 
against Russia and Russian individuals by publishing information sheets on the 
impact of the sanctions on arbitrations concerning such disputes.2 
 
The issues arising, however, are not completely novel. The impact of sanctions on 
international arbitration has been studied and discussed for many years, notably in 
relation to the sanctions against Iraq,3 Libya4 and Iran5.  
 
Sanctions, of course, are a diverse and incoherent set of economic measures. History 
has shown that these can emanate from a State, a group of States, and international 
organizations (including regional organizations). The types of measures taken have 
also proven to be very diverse, ranging from general trade embargos to sanctions 
targeting specific individuals, groups of individuals and/or specific transactions. 
While this book’s general focus lies on United Nations (UN) sanctions, we will not 
limit this chapter to UN enacted sanctions only. The practice of courts and tribunals 
has to date mainly revolved around sanctions imposed by individual States or regional 
organizations, rather than the UN. There appears to be no notable distinction, as a 
matter of principle, between UN and other sanctions in the arbitration context. The 
wording of the sanctions regime is often decisive and there has been much cross-
fertilization between the drafting of the UN and other sanction regimes. Accordingly 
this chapter will discuss the impact of sanctions generally on arbitration, pointing to 
specific differences which may arise from the origin of the sanctions regime, where 
necessary and relevant.  
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1 See for example Irina Moutaye and Elena Billebro, ‘Choice of Arbitration Venue in Light of Sanctions Against 
Russia’, in Anton V. Asoskov, Alexander I. Muranov, Roman M. Khodyki (eds.), New Horizons of International 
Arbitration [Novie gorizonti mejdunarodnogo arbitraja] (2015)49-70, English translation 
<http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/76670/choice-of-arbitration-venue-in-light-of-the-sanctions-against-
russia.pdf> accessed 2 September 2015.  
2 See for example Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ‘General information for parties 
covered by the EU Sanctions’ (18 June 2015)<http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/72852/general-information-to-
listed-parties_eng.pdf> accessed 2 September 2015; Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
‘Q&A on the EU sanctions against Russia’ (18 June 2015) <http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/72851/sanctions-
q-and-a_eng.pdf> accessed 2 September 2015. 
3 See for example. Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage 
commercial international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ 
(2003) Revue de l'Arbitrage 753. 
4 Ibid; Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions 
économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’ (2012) Int'l Bus LJ 405, 405-437. 
5 Ibid. 
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This chapter focuses on the impact of sanctions on international arbitration which can 
be provided for in contracts which have been targeted by the sanctions, or in 
international investment agreements. There are indeed many aspects to this 
interaction, both legal and practical. On a general jurisprudential level, economic 
sanctions highlight various complexities within the arbitral process, viz. the operation 
and interaction of various laws and legal systems (the lex arbitri and law governing 
the arbitration agreement, the substantive law of the contract and the law of the 
enforcing jurisdiction as well as overriding international law principles). These 
various laws may be in play throughout the process, to be applied not only by 
tribunals themselves during the course of proceedings, but also potentially by courts 
deciding or reviewing questions of jurisdiction and public policy (whether at the seat 
or in the enforcing jurisdiction). On a more practical level the increase in relatively 
recent sanctions regimes has led to growing discussion about the implications of these 
regimes for arbitrators and arbitral institutions. 
 
This chapter will discuss these two questions in two separate sections. The first 
section discusses the arbitrability of the dispute, the impact of sanctions on the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, and the impact of sanctions on the enforcement of 
the arbitral award. The second section tackles the influence of sanctions on the 
conduct of arbitration proceedings.  
 
This chapter covers international arbitration in general, making no distinction between 
international commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration, the 
questions arising in both areas being of a similar nature, unless otherwise mentioned. 
This chapter however does not engage with the question of the effect of sanctions on 
the performance of contractual or other obligations which may have been affected by 
the imposed sanctions which is discussed elsewhere in this volume. Similarly, this 
chapter does not engage with the conformity of sanctions with international economic 
and trade law, notably in the context of the World Trade Organization, which is 
covered by Andrew Mitchell in his chapter in this volume.  
 
II Sanctions, Arbitrability of the Dispute, and Enforcement of the Award 
 
2.1. Arbitrability of the dispute 
 
The jurisdiction and competence of an arbitral tribunal are, as is widely known, 
principally determined by the agreement of the parties contained in the agreement to 
arbitrate. The laws of the seat of the arbitration play an important role as well, in that 
the mandatory provisions of these laws may, despite the agreement to arbitrate, in 
effect prevent or hinder the arbitral tribunal from exercising its competence in certain 
circumstances. The problem in respect of sanctions lies in essence in the question of 
whether, because of the public order character of international sanctions, disputes 
which involve, as matter of applicable law, the application of sanctions, thus become 
inarbitrable. Arbitrability is a question that relates to the validity of the arbitration 
clause, and hence touches directly on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. 
 
Arbitrability is a public policy limitation upon the scope of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution method which determines whether a dispute may be arbitrated, and is 
usually divided into arbitrability ratione materiae or objective arbitrability, and 
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arbitrability ratione personae or subjective arbitrability. 6  Arbitrability ratione 
materiae relates to the types of disputes that may validly be submitted to arbitration, 
while arbitrability ratione personae targets the capacity of the parties to the dispute to 
be parties to an arbitration agreement.7 
 
Before engaging in a discussion of the impact of sanctions on the arbitrability of a 
dispute, two points must be emphasized. First, because of the autonomy of the 
arbitration clause, the validity of the arbitration clause remains unaffected even where 
the agreement as such may be invalid in view of the existence of sanctions, or where 
the contract may be denounced because of sanctions.8 Secondly, while the principle of 
arbitrability undoubtedly applies in international commercial arbitration and 
investment arbitration based on contracts, the principles relating to arbitrability do not 
mutatis mutandis apply to investment treaty arbitration.9 Indeed, investment treaty 
arbitration is not an alternative to dispute settlement in national courts, but rather an 
alternative to interstate judicial dispute settlement. 10  As a consequence, States’ 
consent to settle investment disputes through arbitration, expressed in an investment 
treaty, cannot be limited by application of the principle of arbitrability.11  
 
2.1.1. Arbitrability Ratione Materiae 
 
There is generally agreement both in scholarship and the practice of arbitral tribunals 
that the application of a sanctions regime to the dispute does not in and of itself affect 
the arbitrability ratione materiae of the dispute.12 Although it is generally agreed that 
international sanctions have a public policy character and that disputes contrary to 
public policy13 are inarbitrable, such a character has not generally lead to finding that 
disputes in which sanctions are involved are ipso facto inarbitrable. Practice indeed 
shows that arbitral tribunals and domestic courts have accepted that the existence of a 
sanctions regime does not render a dispute inarbitrable, but rather that the public 
policy character of a sanctions regime should be taken into account by the tribunal in 
rendering its decision. This has moreover been the case irrespective of the origin of 
the sanctions regime. 
 
																																																								
6 See L. Yves Fortier, ‘Arbitrability’ in Gerald Aksen, Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Michael J. Mustill, Paolo Michele 
Patocchi and Anne Marie Whitesell (eds.), Global reflections on international law, commerce and dispute 
resolution: liber amicorum in honour of Robert Briner (ICC Publishing 2005) 269-284. 
7 L. Yves Fortier, ‘Arbitrability’ in Gerald Aksen, Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Michael J. Mustill, Paolo Michele 
Patocchi and Anne Marie Whitesell (eds.), Global reflections on international law, commerce and dispute 
resolution : liber amicorum in honour of Robert Briner (ICC Publishing 2005) 270. 
8 Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions 
économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’ (2012) Int'l Bus LJ 405, 426. 
9 See however, Ruth Teitelbaum, ‘A Look at the Public Interest in Investment Arbitration: is it Unique? What 
should we do about it?’ (2010) 5 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 54, 56. 
10 See in extenso: Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law: Procedural 
Aspects and Implications (Cambridge University Press 2014) 150 ff. 
11 Ibid. 
12 For a discussion, see Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur 
l'arbitrage commercial international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux 
arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue de l'Arbitrage 753, 757 ; Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon 
Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’ (2012) Int'l 
Bus LJ 405, 405-437. 
13 The various meanings attributed to the term will be discussed in section [2.2] below. 
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In the ICC Arbitration Fincantieri v. Ministry of Defense of Iraq,14 two Italian ship-
building companies had each concluded an agency contract with a Syrian national in 
view of the sale of military goods to Iraq. Iraq however had fallen subject to UN 
sanctions following the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution in August 
1990. 15  The Syrian agent brought arbitration proceedings against the two Italian 
companies to obtain payment of the commissions due to him by the two companies. 
The two Italian companies however invoked the inarbitrability of the dispute in view 
of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council on Iraq, which in effect prohibited 
any commercial transactions with Iraq. The arbitral tribunal, in an interim decision, 
distinguished the application of the sanctions regime as a matter of mandatory law to 
the merits of the dispute from the arbitrability of the dispute, and confirmed that the 
occurrence of the former does not result in the inarbitrability of the dispute and that 
the application of the sanctions regime does not affect the competence of the arbitral 
tribunal, which in this case had its seat in Switzerland.16 The two Italian companies 
sought nullification of the interim decision before the Swiss courts. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal supported the arbitral tribunal’s interim decision to confirm jurisdiction by 
considering the case arbitrable, basing its decision on Art. 177 of the Swiss Private 
International Law Act (PILA), which contains a broad definition of arbitrability, 
which allows parties to arbitrate ‘toute cause de nature patrimoniale’17. The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal noted that, as a consequence, in principle, the dispute may be 
arbitrated. However, it also enquired whether the arbitrability of the dispute may 
nonetheless be contrary to the international public order of Switzerland. In this 
respect, the Tribunal opined that public order considerations do not render the dispute 
inarbitrable since such considerations would have this effect only to the extent that a 
dispute could only be submitted to domestic courts, as a result of such considerations,. 
In this case, in line with its earlier findings, the Swiss Federal Tribunal considered 
that the existence of a sanctions regime only operates at the level of the contractual 
commitments of the parties, and does not affect the arbitrability of the dispute.18  
 
The Italian shipbuilders in the Fincantieri case had in parallel referred the case 
directly to the Italian courts in order to obtain a declaratory judgement to the effect 
that the arbitration clause was invalid. Although the court of first instance supported 
the arbitrability of the dispute, the Court of Appeal of Genoa reversed this decision.19 
It decided that Italian mandatory law –including legislation relating to international 
sanctions- was applicable to the case. Because of the ‘unavailability’ of the rights in 
question (‘la indisponibilità dell’ “obligo”’20), which under Italian Law determines the 
arbitrability of the dispute(a narrower definition than the one applied by the Swiss 
																																																								
14 Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA and OTO Melara Spa v ATF (25 November 1991) ICC Award Nr 6719 
(Interim Award) Journal du droit international (1994) 1071;Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 
(Second Edition) (Kluwer Law International 2014) 993. 
15 UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661. 
16 Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA and OTO Melara Spa v ATF (25 November 1991) ICC Award Nr 6719 
(Interim Award) Journal du droit international (1994) 1074. 
17Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA et OTO Melara Spa v M et Tribunal Arbitral (23 June 1992) ATF 118 II 
353 (Tribunal Fédéral  Suisse) 355.  
18 Ibid, 357. 
19  Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA v Iraq (1994) Riv. Dell’arb 4 (1994) (Corte di Appello di 
Genova/Genoa Court of Appeal, Italy) 505; see for a discussion: Herbert Kronke, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International 2010) 
361. 
20 Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA v Iraq (1994) Riv. Dell’arb 4 (1994) (Corte di Appello di 
Genova/Genoa Court of Appeal, Italy) 510. 
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Federal Tribunal), the dispute was, according to the Court, indeed inarbitrable.21 The 
decision however was highly criticized by the French Cour d’appel de Paris, which 
refused to enforce the Italian Court decision in France.22  
 
A somewhat different situation occurred in La Compagnie Nationale Air France v. 
Libyan Arab Airlines, an unpublished case, yet widely reported in scholarship.23 Air 
France had a supply and maintenance contract with Libyan Arab Airlines which, 
because of the international embargo imposed by the UN Security Council, could no 
longer be performed by Air France. The difference with the former case lies in the 
fact that Security Council Resolution 883 of 11 November 1993 which imposed 
further international sanctions on Libya, specifically stated: 
 
[T]hat all States, and the Government of Libya, shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government or 
public authorities of Libya, or of any Libyan national, or of any Libyan 
undertaking as defined in paragraph 3 of this resolution, or of any person 
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or undertaking, in 
connection with any contract or other transaction or commercial operation 
where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by or 
pursuant to this resolution or related resolutions.24 
 
The specific reference in Resolution 833 to claims related to the impossibility of 
performing contracts or any commercial transaction because of the sanctions presents 
a somewhat different scenario than the one in Fincantieri. Air France thus argued that 
the dispute was inarbitrable. The UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal, with its seat in 
Montreal, rejected this argument in its first interim award of 10 July 1998 and 
confirmed jurisdiction.25 The Montréal Cour supérieure rejected an appeal by France 
to have this decision annulled, noting that the decision on arbitrability lay within the 
arbitral tribunal’s exclusive competence. The Québec Court of Appeal rejected an 
appeal by France against that decision in 2003, and in doing so provided interesting 
insights on the link between a sanctions regime and the arbitrability of a dispute.26 
The Québec Court of Appeal first confirmed that only the arbitral tribunal is 
competent to decide on the arbitrability of the dispute, and that neither the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, nor the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in Québec 
allow domestic courts to intervene in the arbitral proceedings.27 Such is only the case 
in relation to claims for annulment of the final award, or in respect of proceedings 
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the final award. 28  Article 34 of the 
																																																								
21  Ibid, 505. 
22 Legal Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Iraq v Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani (15 
June 2006) Rev Arb (2007) (Cour d’Appel de Paris/ Paris Court of Appeal, France) 87. 
23 See, amongst others: Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur 
l'arbitrage commercial international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux 
arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue de l'Arbitrage 753, 762 ff. 
24 UNSC Res 883 (11 November 1993) UN Doc S/RES/883, para 8. 
25 See the discussions in La Compagnie Nationale Air France v Libyan Arab Airlines (31 March 2003) CanLII 
35834 (2003) (Cour d’Appel du Québec) paras. 19 ff; Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et 
unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage commercial international - Les états dans le contentieux économique 
international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue de l'Arbitrage 753, 764. 
26  La Compagnie Nationale Air France v Libyan Arab Airlines (31 March 2003) CanLII 35834 (2003) (Cour 
d’Appel du Québec). 
27 Ibid [44]. 
28 Ibid [56]-[86]. 
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UNICTRAL Model Law,29  which deals with applications for setting aside awards, 
provides in this respect that  
 
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only 
if: 
(a) The party making the application furnishes proof that: 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 
was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid 
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing 
any indication thereon, under the law of this State, or 
(…) 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decision on 
matter submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not 
so submitted, only that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set 
aside’. 
 
The Québec Court of Appeal then moved to consider that the applicable Security 
Council Resolutions did not in and of themselves result in the inability of the parties 
to launch arbitration proceedings. 30  After having noted that Security Council 
Resolutions establishing a sanctions regime apply to arbitral tribunals, the Court of 
Appeal further considered that the question whether the sanctions regime applies to 
claims presented before the Resolution -or even thereafter, provided that they are not 
related to the sanctions regime- is a question that needs to be debated before and thus 
answered by the arbitral tribunal; the arbitral tribunal  therefore did not violate 
transnational public order, nor mandatory rules of public international law, in 
reaching its decision.31 In its third interim award, the arbitral tribunal decided that 
only claims relating to contracts entered into before 1 March 1992 were admissible, 
thus recognizing the temporal scope of the sanctions.32 
 
The language of paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 883 has been repeated in 
many subsequent sanction regimes,33 including most recently in the EU sanctions 
																																																								
29 UNCITRAL, ‘Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985 with amendments as adopted in 
2006) <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf> accessed 2 September 
2015.  
30 La Compagnie Nationale Air France v Libyan Arab Airlines (31 March 2003) CanLII 35834 (2003) (Cour 
d’Appel du Québec) [47]. 
31 Ibid [91]-[96]. 
32 Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage commercial 
international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue 
de l'Arbitrage 753, 764. 
33 UNSC Res 687 (3 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687 regarding Iraq; UNSC Res 757 (30 May 1992) UN Doc 
S/RES/757, art 9 regarding Yugoslavia; UNSC Res 917 (6 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/917, art 11 regarding Haiti. 
Whereas the English text has remained identical in the different Resolutions, the French text has changed slightly. 
Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage commercial 
international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue 
de l'Arbitrage 753, 766. 
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regime imposed on Russia. Article 11(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 
31 July 201434 indeed contains similar language: 
 
No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of 
which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the 
measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or 
any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under 
a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or 
indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of 
whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:  
(a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex 
III;  
(b) any other Russian person, entity or body;  
(c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the 
persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph. 
 
In line with the case-law mentioned above, it is thus likely that arbitral tribunals and 
courts confronted with the question whether claims which relate to sanctions are 
arbitrable will confirm that the presence of a sanctions regime, including one which 
prohibits that ‘claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance 
of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures 
imposed […] shall be satisfied’, does not render the dispute inarbitrable. The use of 
the term ‘satisfied’ indeed does not hint at the impossibility of submitting such a 
claim to arbitration, but rather at the inadmissibility of such claims, or the lack of 
merits of such claims from a substantive perspective. This moreover is in line with the 
rationale behind the inclusion of such provisions, which can be traced back to the UN 
sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s, which resulted in the adoption in Iraq of 
legislation declaring that Iraqi parties bear no responsibility for damages caused by 
the impossibility of performance under contracts with foreign parties because of the 
sanctions regime, and, on the contrary, that the foreign parties to such contracts bear 
responsibility for non-performance.35 The provision mentioned above was intended to 
counter such legislation. 
 
Yet, some caution is necessary. Indeed, in view of the decision of the Court of Appeal 
of Genoa, it seems nonetheless that the arbitrability of disputes falling under 
international sanctions largely depends on the law of the seat of the arbitration and the 
law governing the arbitration clause 36  and on the interpretation of the particular 
wording of sanction regimes.37 
 
As far as investment treaty arbitration is concerned, we have explained earlier that the 
concept of arbitrability as such does not apply in treaty-based investment arbitration. 
																																																								
34 Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions 
destabilising the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ L229/1. 
35 Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage commercial 
international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue 
de l'Arbitrage 753, 765. 
36 Yaraslau Kryvoi, ‘Russia’s Mistral Deal under International Sanctions – will the Dispute be Arbitrable?’ (CIS 
Arbitration Forum 3 October 2014) <http://www.cisarbitration.com/2014/10/03/russias-mistral-deal-under-
international-sanctions-will-the-dispute-be-arbitrable/> accessed 2 September 2015.   
37 Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage commercial 
international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue 
de l'Arbitrage 753, 768. 
Unedited	version	–	forthcoming	as	
Eric	De	Brabandere	and	David	Holloway,	“Sanctions	and	International	Arbitration”	(with	David	Holloway),	in	Larissa	van	
den	Herik	(ed.),	Research	Handbook	on	Sanctions	and	International	Law	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2016)	
Yet it seems necessary to briefly mention the few cases which have dealt with the 
application of countermeasures in the context of international investment law. 
Although different from UN sanctions, these cases may provide guidance in relation 
to sanctions in that same context. The arbitral tribunals in the two reported cases have, 
within the limits imposed by the applicable investment treaty –Chapter 11 of the 
NAFTA-, not considered the claim to be ‘inadmissible’ merely because such 
countermeasures were at stake.38 In fact, they have generally accepted that they could, 
as a matter of principle, assess whether the conditions for the invocation of 
countermeasures as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in relation to the breach 
of the applicable investment agreement were met. The questions raised by these cases 
are more concerned with whether countermeasures can preclude the wrongfulness of 
the breach of investor rights under the treaty than the question of whether an arbitral 
tribunal can exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because it concerns 
countermeasures, which in turn depends on whether one views rights conferred under 
investment treaties as ‘direct’ rights of foreign investors or ‘derivative’ rights owed to 
the host State of the foreign investor. 39 The question will thus be whether, in view of 
the sanctions imposed on the Respondent State in application of an international 
sanctions regime, the Respondent State will be able to successfully counter a possible 
violation of an investment treaty by invoking the sanctions regime, either (i) as a 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness, in light of a non-precluded measures clause 
which one regularly finds in North-American investment agreements;40 or (ii) in the 
case of UN sanctions, based on the application of Article 103 of the UN Charter, 
which provides that ‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ In 
that respect, it seems indeed clear that an arbitral tribunal, competent to decide on the 
dispute, will not be barred from assessing the applicability of the sanctions regime.41 
2.1.2. Arbitrability Ratione Personae 
 
As far as the arbitrability ratione personae in the context of sanctions is concerned, 
little if any case-law exists. It should be noted however that the recent tendency of 
sanctions to target specific individuals or corporations may pose a problem of 
arbitrability ratione personae in the event that one of the parties to the dispute 
precisely is an individual or corporation targeted by the sanctions. Such a scenario 
however has not yet occurred in practice, at least there are neither arbitral awards nor 
judicial decisions in the public domain in this respect. Mutatis mutandis however, one 
could apply the same principles in respect of arbitrability ratione maeriae. Based on 
the existing case-law, one can conclude that disputes in which international sanctions 
																																																								
38 See for example Archer Daniels Midland Co v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, 21 November 
2007,[110] ff and Corn Products International Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on 
responsibility, 15 January 2008,[74]-[75] and [180]-[192]. 
39 See Martins Paparinskis, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of State Responsibility’ (2013) 24 
European Journal of International Law (2013) 617 and Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as 
Public International Law: Procedural Aspects and Implications (Cambridge University Press 2014) 60-67. 
40 Such as the one found in the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), which provides, in its Article 18 
‘Essential Security’: ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed:  1. to require a Party to furnish or allow access to 
any information the disclosure of which it  determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or 2. to 
preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with 
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential 
security interests. (<www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> accessed 
21 January 2016).	
41 See for a discussion: Farshad Ghodoosi, ‘Combatting Economic Sanctions: Investment Disputes in Times of 
Political Hostility, a Case Study of Iran’ (2014) 37 Fordham International Law Journal 1731, 1782. 
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targeting specific individuals or corporations are part of the applicable law are in 
principle arbitrable. Here again however, some caution is necessary in view of the 
decision of the Court of Appeal of Genoa. 
 
Here also, in the specific context of investment treaty arbitration, the involvement of 
investors which are individually targeted by sanctions does not seem to pose any 
problems in terms of jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, and what we have explained in 
relation to arbitrability ratione materiae will apply here also.  
2.2. Enforcement of the Award 
 
While the fact that sanctions are at stake in a particular dispute does not in and of 
itself imply that the dispute is inarbitrable, the impact of a sanctions regime on the 
enforcement of the award presents a different question. It may well be indeed that a 
validly rendered award will in effect be unenforceable in certain States because such 
enforcement would be in breach of a sanctions regime.  
 
For the purposes of this section, two grounds which parties may invoke to resist 
enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention (NYC) 42  are 
pertinent  
 
Art. V(2): "[r]ecognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:  
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country. 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country." 
 
These two grounds will be discussed separately. 
 
2.2.1. Article V(2)(a) NYC 
 
Under article V(2)(a) a court or tribunal in the State where enforcement is sought may 
refuse enforcement if and to the extent that, under the law of that State, the dispute is 
inarbitrable.43 The discussion mentioned above in the Fincantieri case illustrates well 
such a scenario, although these disputes were not brought at the recognition and 
enforcement stage. Yet the different national legislation on the issue of arbitrability 
mentioned there clearly shows that a dispute which has been considered arbitrable by 
the arbitral tribunal may nonetheless subsequently be refused recognition and 
enforcement in another State because under the laws of that State the dispute is 
inarbitrable. Such a decision will depend on the specific legal regime in the State 
where enforcement is sought, notably in relation to the appreciation by courts and 
tribunals in that State of whether international sanctions indeed hinder the arbitrability 
and hence enforcement of the award in that State. 
 
																																																								
42 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958, entered 
into force 7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 38. 
43 Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions 
économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’ (2012) Int'l Bus LJ 405, 428. 
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In this respect, it has been considered that arbitrators have a duty to take into account 
the enforceability of their award, and render a valid award capable of being 
recognized and enforced.44 However, as has been noted in the second section of this 
chapter, such a view may be problematic since, first, recognition and enforcement 
may differ substantially from State to State, and secondly, a preventive application of 
the possible non-recognition and non- enforcement of a to-be-rendered award would 
run counter to the fact that the arbitrator needs to decide on the arbitrability of the 
dispute based on its own findings to that effect and the legislation applicable to such a 
decision. 45  Also, parties may voluntarily pay the award, and an award may be 
enforced in several States which may have different legislation regarding the 
arbitrability of the dispute.46 
 
2.2.2. Article V(2)(b) NYC 
 
The second ground on which recognition and enforcement may be refused is the 
public policy ground found in article V(2)(b), which has attracted more attention. 
Such a possibility again depends very much on the presence or not of public policy 
considerations inherent to each State. It is therefore difficult to provide general and 
firm answers to the question whether sanctions, as part of the public policy of certain 
States, would render a decision unenforceable. Indeed, it should be pointed out that 
there are different conceptions of public policy.47 The different conceptions in essence 
revolve around the question of whether the public policy exception is viewed as one 
linked to the public policy of the State where recognition or enforcement is sought 
(domestic public policy or international public policy of the state concerned), or 
whether it is viewed as a public policy transcending one specific legal order (truly 
international public policy or transnational public policy), representing an 
‘international consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that 
must always apply’.48 The concept of public policy varies very much from State to 
State49 and hence it is impossible to make any final determination as to the possibility 
that a State will refuse recognition or enforcement on that ground in case such 
recognition or enforcement would be considered contrary to international sanctions. 
 
It is however relatively clear that an international sanctions regime put in place by 
Security Council Resolutions would form part of a truly international public policy or 
transnational public policy. Sanctions regimes imposed by individual States or 
																																																								
44 See Louis Kossuth, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’, in Pieter 
Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1987) 
258, 272. 
45 Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions 
économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’ (2012) Int'l Bus LJ 405, 428. 
46 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 68. 
47 See in extenso Louis Kossuth, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International 
Arbitration’, in Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law International 1987) 258 – 318.  
48 Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, ‘Interim Report On Public Policy As A Bar To 
Enforcement Of International Arbitral Awards’ in International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference (London 2000) (Interim Report) 2. 
49 Ibid. 
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regional international organizations of the EU would, however, be considered as 
domestic public policy or international public policy of the State(s) concerned.50  
 
Several cases have discussed the matter, notably in the United States. In the landmark 
case of Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v Société Générale de l'Industrie du 
Papier (RAKTA),51 the US Court of Appeal decided that the public policy defence 
‘should be construed narrowly’ and that enforcement of a validly obtained foreign 
arbitral award should be denied ‘only where enforcement would violate the forum 
state's most basic notions of morality and justice’.52 Because in this case the claimant 
had alleged in essence that US national policy rather than international or national 
sanctions opposed enforcement of the award, the Court had no difficulty in dismissing 
the claim, noting that  
 
In equating 'national' policy with United States 'public' policy, the appellant 
quite plainly misses the mark. To read the public policy defense as a parochial 
device protective of national political interests would seriously undermine the 
Convention's utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of 
international politics under the rubric of 'public policy.' Rather, a 
circumscribed public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's 
framers and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the 
Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational emphasis.53 
 
This principle has been applied subsequently in various other decisions, and most 
notably in Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Gould, Inc.54 which 
involved US imposed sanctions on Iran. The case concerned the enforcement of an 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal award. The award was rendered in a dispute relating to the 
performance of a contract by a US party regarding certain military equipment for the 
Ministry of War of the Iranian Imperial Government. The arbitral tribunal ordered, 
inter alia, that the US company return certain equipment to Iran. Such equipment 
however was listed on the US Munitions List and thus subject to US export 
restrictions. The US District Court in California refused to authorize enforcement of 
the part of the award which ordered the restitutio in integrum, since this would be in 
violation of US legislation.  
 
In MGM Productions Group v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines55, the US District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, quoting the Parson’s case, dismissed the request 
by Aeroflot to deny enforcement of an arbitral award based on the public policy 
defense. In that case, MGM was the assignee of an arbitral award obtained by Russo 
International Ventures, Inc., a New York corporation, against Aeroflot. Russo had a 
consultancy contract with Aeroflot to provide consulting services in relation to 
																																																								
50 See for a discussion: Geneviève Burdeau, ‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur 
l'arbitrage commercial international - Les états dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux 
arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue de l'Arbitrage 753, 755 ff. 
51 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) (1974) 508 F.2d 969 
(US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit).  
52 Ibid [9]. See also Belship Navigation Inc v Sealift Inc (1995) 95 Civ. 2748 (RPP) (US District Court, Southern 
District of New York) 14. 
53 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) (1974) 508 F.2d 969 
(US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) [10]. 
54 David J. Bederman, ‘Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Gould Inc 887 F.2d 1357; certiorari 
denied, 110 S Ct 1319’ (1990) 84(2) American Journal of International Law 556, 556-560. 
55 MGM Productions Group v Aeroflot Russian Airlines (2003) 573 F Supp 2d 772 (SDNY). 
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various activities relating to the leasing of aircraft and parts by Aeroflot to Iran Air, 
and had initiated arbitration proceedings against Aeroflot for withholding 
commissions due to Russo. Aeroflot in turn argued that the contract was null and 
void, being contrary to US imposed sanctions in Iran. The tribunal considered that 
since the contract concerned services provided to Aeroflot and not to an Iranian 
entity, the contract was not in breach of US sanctions. Aeroflot however challenged 
the enforcement of the award, basing its challenge on the public policy exception in 
the New York Convention, and argued that enforcement would violate US sanctions 
against Iran. Since the contract was not in fact in breach of US sanctions, the US 
District Court had no difficulty in concluding that enforcement would also, therefore, 
not be contrary to the US’ ‘most basic notions of morality and justice’. The judgment 
was later affirmed by the US Court of Appeals on the same considerations.56 
 
Another case worthy of mention is Ministry of Defence of Iran (“MoD”) v. Cubic 
Defence Systems Inc. Cubic, a US company, and the Ministry of Defence of Iran had 
agreed on the sale and servicing by the former to the latter of an Air Combat 
Manoeuvring Range. After the Iranian revolution, Cubic sold the equipment to 
Canada since the contract with Iran could not be performed because of the US 
sanctions against Iran then in force, however it was agreed that Cubic would 
reimburse Iran for the amounts it had already paid. The Ministry of Defence of Iran 
brought the case before an ICC Arbitral Tribunal which issued an award in favour of 
the Ministry of Defence of Iran. In the meantime, the US and other States and 
international organizations had imposed or further expanded various financial and 
trade sanctions on Iran. Cubic refused to pay the amounts due to the Ministry of 
Defence of Iran, invoking only the very broad US sanctions regime - probably 
because the US sanctions regime more clearly covered the payment that was due to 
the Ministry of Defence of Iran than the UN sanctions regime, which targeted more 
specifically Iran’s nuclear activities.57 In a 2011 decision, the US Court of Appeals 
denied the claim by Cubic that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of the US because of the sanctions the US had imposed 
on Iran.58 The sanctions regime  however required Cubic to obtain from the US 
Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control a specific license to pay 
the ICC award. The Court, backed by an amicus curiae from the US Department of 
Treasury and US Department of State, considered that the sanctions regime does not 
in fact prohibit payments, since such a license can be obtained, and that as a 
consequence recognition (‘confirmation’) of the arbitral award was not contrary to the 
sanctions regime, nor to the public policy of the US.59 
 
In a decision of 2013, the US District Court for the Southern District of California60 
was asked by the Ministry of Defence of Iran to award prejudgment interest from the 
date of the final arbitration award (5 May 1997) to the date the US District Court for 
the Southern District of California had confirmed the ICC award, i.e. 10 August 
																																																								
56MGM Productions Group v Aeroflot Russian Airlines, Summary Order (9 February 2004) WL037561 ( US Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit). 
57 See on the scope of the sanctions: Farshad Ghodoosi, ‘Combatting Economic Sanctions: Investment Disputes in 
Times of Political Hostility, a Case Study of Iran’ (2014) 37 Fordham International Law Journal 1731, 1770 ff. 
58Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic v Cubic Defense Systems (2011) Case Nr. 
99–56380, 99–56444 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).  
59 Ibid, 21004 ff. 
60Ministry of Defence of Iran (“MoD”) v Cubic Defence Systems Inc (3 January 2013) Case 98-CV-1165-B (SD 
Cal). 
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199961. Cubic considered, inter alia, that ‘it should not be "punished" because Iran is a 
"rogue" state and a sponsor of terrorism’.62 Using the same considerations as the US 
Court of Appeals, the US District Court for the Southern District of California 
considered that the sanctions regime in force and US regulations did not excuse 
Cubic’s retention of the amounts due to the Ministry of Defense of Iran. It thus 
awarded prejudgment interest. 
 
Finally, in the more recent case of Iranian Co. Z v. Swiss Co. X63 in 2014, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal upheld a decision by a Geneva Court to grant enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award in which an arbitral tribunal had ordered a Swiss company and 
three Israeli companies to pay an Iranian company amounts due for shipments of 
crude oil delivered by the Iranian company. The Swiss company opposed recognition 
and enforcement of the arbitral award before the courts in Geneva, based on the fact 
that payment to the Iranian company would be in breach of Swiss public policy, and 
the prohibition by ‘the international community … for the economic players to 
provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with financial means of whatever form’.64 In this 
case, although the judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal does not make any mention 
of the specific regime invoked, the UN sanctions regime in place seems to have been 
the main component of the claim by the Swiss company, considering the explicit 
mention of ‘the international community’. The Swiss Federal Tribunal however 
confirmed the decision of the Geneva Court, and noted that it could not understand 
why such ‘abstract considerations’ would lead to a finding that payments to an Iranian 
company of amounts awarded to it for unpaid invoices would ‘be incompatible with 
Swiss public policy’.65  
 
Here again, as with the cases discussed in relation to arbitrability, which similarly 
revolve around the question of States’ interpretation of what constitutes public policy, 
it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions as to the possibility of a refusal of 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on the basis of the public policy 
exception in the New York Convention. Such a decision will depend on the specific 
features of the award, the impact of the enforcement and the performance required by 
the award on the sanctions regime in place, the question of whether the sanctions 
regime has been imposed by the UN, an individual State or a regional organization, 
the specific sanctions imposed, and of course the interpretation of the public policy 
exception, which as noted earlier, and in view of the case-law mentioned, has no 
uniform definition. However, it seems safe to conclude that in any case, a refusal to 
authorize enforcement will likely occur if and to the extent that the effective 
enforcement of the award results in a clear and direct breach of the sanctions regime 
in place.  
 
As will also be discussed in the next section, it should be pointed out that recent 
sanction regimes contain carve out provisions for payments following an arbitral 
award or judicial decision rendered prior to the sanctions regime. UN Security 
Council Resolution 1970 imposing sanctions on Libya for instance, provides that the 
																																																								
61 Ministry of Defence of Iran (“MoD”) v. Cubic Defence Systems Inc (7 December 1998) 29 F.Supp.2d 1168, 
1172-74 (SD Cal). 
62 Ministry of Defence of Iran (“MoD”) v Cubic Defence Systems Inc (3 January 2013) Case 98-CV-1165-B (SD 
Cal).  
63 Iranian Co Z v Swiss Co X (21 January 2014) Case 4A_250/2013 (Tribunal Fédéral Suisse). 
64 Ibid, 5. 
65 Ibid. 5.  
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asset freeze does not apply to ‘funds, other financial assets or economic resources 
[…] subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the 
funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien 
or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of 
the present resolution’.66 Such exemption however, does not apply in the event that 
the payment is for the benefit of an individual or entity which has been specifically 
targeted by the sanctions regime.67 
 
III Procedural Issues for Arbitrators and Institutions 
 
On a more practical level the increase in relatively recent sanctions regimes (Iran, 
Syria, North Korea, Libya, Russia) has led to growing discussion about the 
implications of these regimes for arbitrators and arbitral institutions. Arbitrators as 
individuals will be naturally keen to avoid breaching applicable sanctions. Arbitrators 
need guidance not only on the legal complexities involved in deciding a sanctions-
related dispute, but also on compliance procedures which need to be followed relating 
to their own involvement in such a dispute. The position of international arbitral 
institutions is perhaps more interesting, particularly in the context of regional, as 
opposed to international, sanctions. Despite providing services relating to 
international rather than domestic dispute resolution, arbitral institutions enjoy a 
reputation which has a traditionally strong connection to their host city or country 
(London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC – Paris), Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)) and / or its legal system. As 
the legal regimes in those jurisdictions have changed with the implementation of 
sanctions regimes, the institutions have strived to emphasise their neutrality. 
Neutrality (and the perception of neutrality) is extremely important in the provision of 
arbitral services, never more so than in relation to parties from countries subject to 
sanctions measures. In an increasingly competitive market for arbitration services, 
any perceived weakness or lack of neutrality on the part of an arbitration institution is 
likely to be seen as an opportunity for rival institutions in other jurisdictions (such as 
the Middle East and East Asia). This section will seek to consider the impact of 
sanctions on arbitral institutions against that context.  
 
3.1. Do Sanctions Apply to an Individual Arbitrator or Tribunal? 
 
Sanctions include trade embargoes, import and export restrictions, travel and visa 
restrictions and financial restrictions. These can be directed against targeted named 
individuals, specific industries, governments or more widely against all trade 
involving particular States. Whilst any of these types of measures can be of 
importance to a given dispute, sanctions in the form of financial restrictions are likely 
to be of key importance in terms of an arbitrator’s personal involvement in a case.  
 
The language of such measures is frequently drawn widely to include: 
 
																																																								
66 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1970, para. 19(c). 
67 Ibid. 
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(i) Asset freezes – measures which would prohibit accepting payments from 
persons or companies of a certain nationality, or from certain listed 
individuals.68 
(ii) Measures which prohibit provision of services from persons or companies 
of a certain nationality, or from certain listed individuals.69 
 
These types of measures may well prima facie be wide enough in scope to cover the 
activities of an arbitrator, and may prima facie preclude an arbitrator from acting, or 
accepting payment when the parties to a dispute, or one of the parties, falls within the 
scope of a measure. 
 
Within the EU a territorial approach to the applicability of sanctions is observed.70 
This means that sanctions will apply where a connection exists between the measure 
and the EU, such as the involvement of an EU company or citizen. In practical terms, 
it is submitted that arbitrators will be personally bound by the provisions of sanctions 
imposed by EU Regulations where they are EU nationals or where the seat of 
arbitration is within the EU. EU measures may include not only EU imposed 
sanctions (such as those imposed on Russian entities)71 but also sanctions imposed by 
UN Security Council Resolutions, which are implemented within the EU by 
regulation.72  
 
Similarly under UK law sanctions will be applicable to any individual working within 
UK territory. UK citizens and UK established companies or organisations operating 
outside the UK are also bound by UK (and EU) sanctions regimes. 73  This will 
effectively mean that an arbitrator who is a UK citizen will be personally bound by 
provisions of UK and EU sanctions wherever the seat of arbitration. Non UK citizens 
will be bound by the UK and EU sanctions regimes when sitting as arbitrators in the 
UK. 
 
																																																								
68 Executive Order No 13660, ‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine’ (6 
March 2014) 79 Fed Reg 46; Council Decision (EU) 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive 
measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of 
Ukraine [2014] OJ L78/16.  
69 Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions 
destabilising the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ L229/1; US Department of Treasury, ‘Announcement of Expanded 
Treasury Sanctions within the Russian Financial Services, Energy and Defense or Related Material Sectors’ (12 
September 2014) <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx> accessed 15 October 
2015. 
70 See Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures 
(sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (15 June 2012) para. 51, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202012%20INIT>. See also Dominic 
Pellew, ‘The Effect of the EU Russia Related Sanctions on Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions’ (2015) (3) Les 
Cahiers de l’arbitrage / The Paris Journal of International Arbitration 471, 472. 
71 See for example Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of 
Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ L229/1. 
72 See Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures 
(sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (15 June 2012) para. 43 ff, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202012%20INIT> accessed 15 October 
2015. 
73 HM Treasury, ‘Financial Sanctions: Frequently Asked Questions’ (August 2013) p 24 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/302397/August_2013_version_-
_amended.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015. 
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US sanctions are often drafted very widely and can be applicable not only to US 
persons, but their subsidiaries and where transactions relate to US goods.74 Perhaps 
more tricky for arbitrators is the applicability of sanctions which purport to apply 
extraterritorially such as many US measures targeting trade with Cuba, Iran and 
Syria. 75  Whilst extraterritorial trade measures remain a controversial issue in 
international law76, these cannot be ignored by the individual arbitrator, who should 
ideally ensure personal compliance with: 
 
(i) Sanctions regimes applicable by virtue the law of their home jurisdiction 
(e.g. UK and EU law for a UK citizen, US law for a US citizen); AND 
(ii) The sanctions regimes applicable at the seat of the arbitration; AND 
(iii) Any sanctions regimes potentially applicable by virtue of extraterritorial 
application of laws. 
 
One of the first practical issues presented by this is actually being aware of the 
specifics of the many sanctions regimes in place. This is especially difficult in relation 
to extraterritorial measures from third countries.77 Apart from the need for greater 
general awareness on the part of arbitrators, recourse should be made to the official 
government information sources in the relevant jurisdictions from the outset of any 
dispute.78  
 
The situation is less straightforward in relation to UN sanctions which have not been 
transposed to national and / or regional legislation. Most importantly, recent UN 
sanctions have been directed at States primarily, in that the obligations are imposed 
on States only. Paragraph 17 of Security Council Resolution 1970, which imposed 
sanctions on Libya79 for instance directs the assets freeze to the UN Member States: 
‘Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial 
assets and economic resources which are on their territories …’. The same is true for 
the travel ban.80  The wording thus excludes, prima facie, a direct obligation for 
arbitrators to comply with a UN enacted sanctions regime. Secondly, in any event, as 
will be explained in section 3.3, recent UN sanctions regimes contain carve out 
provisions which exempt legal services and payment of legal fees from the imposed 
travel bans and / or asset freezes. 
																																																								
74 Rathbone, Jeydel and Lentz, ‘Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging a Path Through Complex Transnational 
Sanctions Laws’ (2013) 44 Georgetown Journal of International Law  1055; Executive Order No 13660, ‘Blocking 
Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine’ (6 March 2014) 79 Fed Reg 46, sections 1(a) 
and 6(c). 
75 See Rathbone, Jeydel and Lentz, ‘Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging a Path Through Complex 
Transnational Sanctions Laws’ (2013) 44 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1055, see in particular the 
discussion of extraterritorial “secondary” sanctions measures against Iran discussed at  1112 ff. 
76 Council Regulation (EC) 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial 
application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom [1996] OJ 
L309. 
77 See Rathbone, Jeydel and Lentz, ‘Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging a Path Through Complex 
Transnational Sanctions Laws’ (2013) 44 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1055, 1112. 
78 For an overview of the sanctions imposed by the US, EU and UK, see US Department of Treasury, ‘Sanctions 
Programs and Country Information’ <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx>; US Department of Treasury, ‘Code of Federal Regulations’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/CFR-links.aspx>; European Union EEAS, ‘Sanctions 
Policy’ <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm>;  UK Government Business and Enterprise Guidance, 
‘Sanctions, Embargoes and Restrictions’ <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sanctions-embargoes-and-
restrictions#types-of-sanctions-and-embargoes> accessed 15 October 2015. 
79 Security Council Resolution 1970, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011).  
80 Ibid, para. 15. See also, in relation to UN sanctions against North Korea: Security Council Resolution 1718, 
S/RES/1718 (2006), paras. 8 and 9. 
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3.2. Compliance by Arbitrators 
 
Given that most sanctions regimes provide for potential criminal liability and stiff 
financial penalties for any breach (not to mention the potential reputational damage) 
arbitrators will be keen to ensure strict compliance with applicable measures.81  
 
A preliminary question is how thorough an arbitrator must be in detecting the 
applicability of a sanctions measure. If the parties to an arbitration do not obviously 
appear to be from an affected jurisdiction should the enquiry end there, or should the 
arbitrator perform some more detailed preliminary checks to ensure that the sanctions 
regimes are not triggered by virtue of the connections of one or more of the parties to 
a proscribed individual or regime? 
 
The regimes vary on their approaches to this. From the EU perspective, arbitrators 
will not be liable if they ‘did not know and has no reasonable cause to suspect’ that 
their action constituted a violation. 82  The UK sanctions regime follows the EU 
approach: an arbitrator will not be liable if (s)he did not know and could not have 
known of the breach.83 From the US perspective many measures provide that a person 
will not be criminally liable if (s)he did not know and could not reasonably have 
known. However, the Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil penalty for which 
knowledge of a violation is not a requirement.84  
 
It may be straightforward for an arbitrator to see or ascertain from the outset whether 
a party:  
 
(i) is from a jurisdiction affected by economic sanctions imposed by a 
relevant authority;85 or 
(ii) is listed as a person or organization proscribed on the various lists 
published by a relevant authority.86 
																																																								
81 For US sanctions regimes enacted under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), maximum penalties which 
can be imposed for a wilful violation are a fine of $100,000 or imprisonment of 10 years or both for an individual 
and a fine of $1,000,000 for a legal person. Apart from those penalties, transaction-based civil penalties can be 
imposed, see US 31 CFR 501.701. The maximum penalties imposed under the UK sanctions regime concerning 
Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol range from imprisonment for 6 months up to 10 years and / or a fine of £5,000 
(depending on the offence), see UK Customs 2014 No 2357, The Export Control (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol 
Sanctions) Order 2014.  The EU sanctions regime leaves freedom to its Member States to lay down the rules on 
applicable penalties, see Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in 
view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ L229/1, art 8. 
82 Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions 
destabilising the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ L229/1, arts 10 and 12. 
83 HM Treasury, ‘Financial Sanctions: Frequently Asked Questions’ (August 2013) p 26. See also Dominic Pellew, 
‘The Effect of the EU Russia Related Sanctions on Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions’ (2015) (3) Les Cahiers de 
l’arbitrage / The Paris Journal of International Arbitration 471, 480. 
84 US 31 CFR 501.701. 
85 US Department of Treasury, ‘Sanctions Programs and Country Information’ <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx>; US Department of Treasury, ‘Code of Federal Regulations’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/CFR-links.aspx>; European Union EEAS, 
‘Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions’ 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm>; UK Government Business and enterprise 
guidance, ‘Sanctions, Embargoes and Restrictions’ <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sanctions-embargoes-and-
restrictions#types-of-sanctions-and-embargoes> accessed 15 October 2015. 
86 US Department of Treasury, ‘Sanctions Programs and Country Information’ <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx>; US Department of Treasury, ‘Code of Federal Regulations’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/CFR-links.aspx>; European Union EEAS, 
‘Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions’ 
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It is submitted that an international arbitrator would be expected to do such basic due 
diligence and would not be excused for any breach on the basis that (s)he had not 
been aware of information made publically available by the relevant authorities. 
Individual arbitrators may wish to develop flagging systems of their own, while those 
working in large law firms may well have sophisticated systems to draw upon. 
 
The level of checks required may also vary depending on the arbitrator. A Belgian 
arbitrator working as a law professor in Belgium and appointed to decide an LCIA 
arbitration seated in London may need to check the parties against applicable UK and 
EU sanctions. A Belgian arbitrator who is a partner in a US law firm appointed in the 
same case may well have to consider the implications of US sanctions both for 
himself / herself and his / her partners and firm.  
 
It will certainly be less straightforward for arbitrators to judge from the outset whether 
parties or transactions are ’controlled by’ or ’acting on behalf of’ proscribed 
individuals, industries or jurisdictions as provided in some sanctions instruments.87 
There are no clear cut rules to follow in these situations, which are inevitably 
somewhat questions of degree and judgment. It is submitted that arbitrators should not 
be required to conduct detailed investigations of the business dealings of parties at the 
outset of a dispute. Ignorance of the relevant connections may, however, not be a 
defence to any breach of a sanctions provision.88 In that regard arbitrators are well 
advised to conduct as much due diligence as possible and to follow reasonable lines 
of enquiry, reporting and discussing any questions with the authorities in question.  
 
3.3. Exemptions from Sanctions Regimes, Reporting and Licensing 
 
In the EU, many sanctions regimes provide for an exemption or ‘carve out’ 
specifically for the provision of legal services or the payment of legal fees.89 The 
payment of arbitrator’s fees and the provision of services as arbitrator may well come 
within the ambit of such exemptions in principle, but it is important to note that in 
most cases the exemption is not available as of right, nor is it available in all cases. It 
																																																																																																																																																														
<http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm>;  UK Government Business and enterprise 
guidance, ‘Sanctions, Embargoes and Restrictions’ <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sanctions-embargoes-and-
restrictions#types-of-sanctions-and-embargoes> accessed 15 October 2015. 
87 See the US position in for example 31 CFR 501 ff<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Pages/CFR-links.aspx> accessed 15 October 2015. 
88 See n72 and 73 above. 
89 See Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures 
(sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (15 June 2012) para. 25 ff 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202012%20INIT> accessed 15 October 
2015; Council Regulation (EC) 329/2007 of 27 March 2007 concerning restrictive measures against the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [2007] OJ L88/1, art 6 provides exemptions for funds ‘intended 
exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with 
the provision of legal services’. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury and Commerce Announce Further 
Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions Regulations’ (18 September 2015) <http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl0169.aspx> accessed 15 October 2015; ‘OFAC’s existing general license authorizing 
the provision of certain legal services to Cuba and Cuban nationals will be expanded to allow the receipt of 
payment for such services’. Regarding the US sanctions regime for Russia, see OFAC, ‘Guidance on the Release 
of Limited Amounts of Blocked Funds for Payment of Legal Fees and Costs Incurred in Challenging the Blocking 
of US Persons in Administrative or Civil Proceedings’ <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/legal_fee_guide.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015. 
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may be subject to the approval of State authorities.90 Sometimes the State itself must 
itself obtain higher authorization (from the UN) to grant an exemption.91 
 
Recent UN sanctions also contain carve out provisions for legal services or the 
payment of legal fees. Resolution 1970 imposing sanctions on Libya for instance 
provides that the travel ban imposed under paragraph 15 does not apply ‘where entry 
or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process’.92 In relation to the asset 
freeze, the Resolution also carves out ‘funds, other financial assets or economic 
resources […] necessary for […] payment of reasonable professional fees and 
reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in 
accordance with national laws.93 
The US system is one of specific authorisations, general and specific licences. US 
sanctions instruments often provide more detailed carve outs for legal services and 
legal representation than their EU counterparts. The US Libyan sanctions regime, for 
example, provides for certain activities to be exempted from the general prohibitions 
contained in the regulation.94 These exemptions include the representation of Libyan 
parties before proceedings in the US or advising such parties on US law as counsel. It 
is not clear whether acting as arbitrator in a dispute (especially in international 
proceedings located outside the US) would fall within the exemptions referred to 
above. Such conduct would therefore require to be specifically licensed by the 
authorities. 
 
The US Iran sanction regime has a somewhat broader carve out as pertains to 
international proceedings covering:95 
 
(5) Initiation and conduct of legal proceedings, in the United States or abroad, 
including administrative, judicial, and arbitral proceedings and proceedings 
before international tribunals (including the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
in The Hague and the International Court of Justice): 
(i) To resolve disputes between the Government of Iran or an Iranian 
national and the United States or a United States national; or  
(ii) Where the proceeding is contemplated under an international 
agreement; 
 
This latter provision may well authorise acting as an arbitrator in an international 
case. As will be seen from the above, the position is complicated given the sheer 
numbers of measures in place. Where sanctions are prima facie applicable, the 
arbitrator should apply to the competent authorities for an exemption in order to 
accept the appointment unless there is a clear authorization in place permitting arbitral 
appointments. 
 
																																																								
90 Council Regulation (EC) 329/2007 of 27 March 2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea [2007] OJ L88/1.   
91 Council Regulation (EU) 204/2011 of 2 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in 
Libya [2011] OJ L58/1 provides in article 7 a similar carve out for legal services/fees, however, requiring that any 
such exemption be approved by the UN Sanctions Committee. 
92 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1970 , para. 16(b). See also, in relation to UN sanctions 
against North Korea: UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006), S/RES/1718, para. 9(a). 
93 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1970, para. 19(a). See also, in relation to UN sanctions 
against North Korea: UNSC Res 1718 (14 October 2006), S/RES/1718, para. 9(b). 
94 See US 31 CFR 570.506.  
95 See US 31 CFR 560.525. 
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Many sanctions provide for reporting mechanisms, whereby the authorities in 
question can give guidance as to the applicability of sanctions. The prudent course of 
action for an arbitrator is naturally to report any concerns arising from an appointment 
through the appropriate channels.96 The duties are ongoing, so if initial due diligence 
were not to raise any questions as to the applicability of a sanctions measure, but it 
were to become obvious in the course of proceedings that the dispute did in fact fall 
within the scope of such a measure, an arbitrator would generally be required to 
declare his/her (albeit inadvertent) breach of the measure to the authorities and to seek 
authorization for further conduct of the case.97 
 
A final point on the issue of the arbitrator’s personal responsibility for compliance 
with economic sanctions relates to the immunity of arbitrators. Whilst most national 
laws grant arbitrators wide ranging immunity in relation to their conduct of 
proceedings,98 it is submitted that this principle would not exempt arbitrators from 
any breaches of sanctions regimes or obviate the need for due diligence or compliance 
with the measures. As noted elsewhere sanctions measures will form part of the 
regulatory framework and criminal law in the relevant jurisdictions as well as being 
part of national (if not international) public policy.  
 
3.4. The effect of Sanctions in the Course of Proceedings 
 
Treatment of each of the many issues of law arising in arbitrations involving sanctions 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. Much has been written elsewhere in this book 
about the impact of sanctions on international contracts 99  and elsewhere in this 
chapter about the impact of sanctions on arbitral jurisdiction and arbitrability. One 
salient question relating to the discussion of the arbitrator’s personal responsibility 
under sanctions regimes is the extent to which arbitrators should be alive to sanctions 
issues, regardless of whether these have been raised by the parties. Should the 
arbitrator investigate the potential applicability of sanctions, even when this has not 
been raised by the parties? What is the arbitrator to do when a transaction has been 
structured to avoid the applicability of sanctions (for example by virtue of a choice of 
law clause which excludes EU / US or any other relevant law)? 
 
It is submitted that the answer to the first question is yes for a number of reasons. 
First, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, the nature of sanctions measures 
deems them to be of a mandatory character,  such that in an arbitration seated within 
the EU, an attempt to exclude the operation of EU sanctions would be impermissible 
as a result of EU public policy. Further and as described above, arbitrators themselves 
may be liable for breaches of sanctions regimes, where the effect of their conduct of 
the proceedings has been to fail to apply sanctions, to facilitate the movement of 
prohibited monies or the transfer of property, to uphold transactions with proscribed 
																																																								
96 EU EEAS, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on EU Restrictive Measures’ (September 2014) p 4 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/frequently_asked_questions_en.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015. 
97 See,  for example in relation to the United Kingdom: HM Treasury, ‘Financial Sanctions: Frequently Asked 
Questions’ (August 2013) p 26. 
98 In the UK and the US, immunity for arbitrators has mainly been developed in jurisprudence. In analogy with 
judges, this immunity has generally been interpreted widely. The legislation in civil law countries varies, but all 
countries seem to grant arbitrators immunity to some degree. See Anastasia Tsakatoura, ‘The Immunity of 
Arbitrators’ (Inter-Lawyer, 2002) <http://www.inter-lawyer.com/lex-e-scripta/articles/arbitrators-immunity.htm> 
accessed 15 October 2015. 
99 See the Chapter by Mercédeh Azeredo da Silveira in this volume. 
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organisations etc. This provides both a legal and practical incentive for arbitrators to 
investigate the issue from the outset.  
 
A final word here relates to the obligation of arbitrators to ensure that an award is 
enforceable, which has been touched upon in the previous section. The authors here 
reiterate their agreement with the position stated by Geisinger and others,100 that this 
does not oblige the arbitrators to ensure their award complies with every conceivable 
national law under which the award might be enforced. Rather the obligation ought to 
be to render an award which is not susceptible to challenge in the courts of the seat of 
arbitration on public policy grounds. In this regard arbitrators should be alert to 
devices which may be used to circumvent sanctions, such as the choice of law clauses 
mentioned above, or surprising consent agreements whose purpose is to affect 
payments which would be prohibited under relevant sanctions provisions. When a 
consent award is permissible on its face at the seat of arbitration, but unenforceable on 
public policy grounds in a third country, an arbitrator’s approach ought to be 
determined by his / her own interpretation of the measures themselves and their 
applicability to the dispute and to the arbitrator personally.  
 
Of course there may be cases where there is no connection whatsoever between the 
arbitration, its curial or substantive law, the arbitrators and a given sanctions regime.  
Even in these cases it will have done no harm for the arbitrators to have investigated 
compliance with their own national law, the law of the seat, the law of the parties and 
of any relevant third party state as mentioned at the outset of this section. This issue 
should not arise frequently in proceedings if proper due diligence is exercised at the 
outset. 
 
3.5. Issues relating to Arbitration Institutions 
 
In a broad sense the position of institutions does not differ greatly from that of 
arbitrators in relation to the practical matters referred to above. Although institutions 
are not individuals they are ‘entities’ organized under the laws of certain jurisdictions 
and doing business there.101 In the case of the ICC, LCIA and SCC among others, the 
position is that they are bound by the sanctions regimes in place within the EU (and 
the various home jurisdictions) and must therefore perform similar acts of due 
diligence, compliance and reporting as do arbitrators before accepting cases onto their 
books or accepting monies (such as advances on fees and costs) from disputing 
parties.102 
 
In addition to performing due diligence as to the identity of the parties and the subject 
matter of the dispute, institutions may well need to consider compliance implications 
when performing their role as appointing authorities or in confirming the appointment 
of the arbitrators. The appointment of arbitrators (either by virtue of delegated 
authority by the parties or, increasingly, under default provisions of the rules of the 
institutions) 103  is a difficult area of practice. Whilst arbitrators are of course 
																																																								
100 Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions 
économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’, (2012) Int'l Bus LJ 405, 428. 
101 The LCIA for instance is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee under UK law. 
102 See footnotes 1, 2 and 94 giving some information on the compliance mechanisms in place. [To confirm cross 
refs] 
103 See the International Court of Arbitration, ‘ICC Rules of Arbitration’ (1 January 2012) (ICC Rules 2012) arts 
12 and 13 and London Court of International Arbitration, ‘LCIA Arbitration Rules’ (1 October 2014) (LCIA Rules 
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responsible personally for compliance with applicable regimes, there is a question 
arising as to whether the institutions should be alive to sanctions issues during the 
process of appointing or confirming the appointment of arbitrators and how these 
issues should be dealt with. Should an arbitrator who is an EU / US national be 
excluded from appointments by an arbitral institution in disputes which are the 
subject of EU / US sanctions? Should the institution perform due diligence as to the 
arbitrator’s potential exposure to sanctions regimes prior to their appointment / 
confirmation? Should they alert potential candidates to the issue (for example giving 
them the opportunity to apply for authorisation for the appointment by the authorities) 
or should they simply leave this issue for the arbitrators to decide for themselves? 
Anecdotal evidence in what can only be described as an opaque area of arbitral 
practice suggests that there is a distinct lack of uniformity as to how this issue is being 
approached within the institutions. The issue is obviously one of great political and 
commercial sensitivity. It is submitted that even institutions which are not located in 
countries with applicable sanctions regimes (such as many outside the EU and US) 
should be developing compliance mechanisms as a matter of good practice (avoiding 
unnecessary delay and expense) if not strict legal obligation.   
 
Obviously the involvement in the conduct and administration of cases varies from 
institution to institution so whilst many of the sanctions related questions facing 
arbitrators in the course of proceedings will not be relevant to institutions, they must 
also be aware that activities such as confirming arbitral awards (e.g. consent awards) 
may raise questions (similar to those faced by arbitrators) in the course of 
proceedings. Additionally whilst many institutions exclude in their own rules liability 
for their conduct of proceedings, these are normally interpreted by national authorities 
as something akin to contractual exclusion clauses whose purpose is to prevent re-
litigation of arbitral disputes by the parties. They are also generally subject to limits 
imposed by the applicable law.104 In our submission such provisions could not afford 
the institutions with a defence to any breach of otherwise applicable sanctions 
regimes or obviate them from the requirements of compliance and reporting under 
such measures.  
 
Arbitral institutions within the EU (such as the ICC, LCIA and SCIA) have long 
enjoyed a position of trust with Russian companies as hosts for neutral resolution of 
international disputes.105 Since the imposition of EU sanctions targeting Russia this 
has been called into question in some quarters, with some Russian parties expressing 
less willingness to use European arbitral institutions as a result of the EU sanctions.106 
European institutions have been quick to stress that the effects of the EU / Russia 
																																																																																																																																																														
2014) art 5. Both the LCIA and the ICC have powers to appoint or “confirm” the appointment of the Tribunal 
notwithstanding that candidates have been chosen by the parties. 
104 ICC Rules 2012 art 40;  LCIA Rules 2014 art 31; Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ‘Arbitration Rules of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce’ (1 January 2010) article 48. 
105 Yaraslau Kryvoi, ‘Russian Arbitration Users in Europe: Growth and Misunderstandings’ (CIS Arbitration 
Forum, 20 January 2011) <http://www.cisarbitration.com/2011/01/20/russian-arbitration-users-in-europe-growth-
and-misunderstandings/>; Vladimir Khvalei, ‘B2B: No Country for Russian Disputes?’ The Moscow Times (23 
April 2015) <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=519651> accessed 15 October 2015. 
106 Olga Boltenko, ‘Hong Kong Emerges as Russia’s Refuge while the EU’s Sanctions Cripple Major Russian 
Businesses’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 24 November 2014) <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/11/24/hong-
kong-emerges-as-russias-refuge-while-the-eus-sanctions-cripple-major-russian-businesses/> accessed 15 October 
2015; Justin D’Agostino, Brenda Horrigan and Rebecca Soquier, ‘When the East Meets the Far East: the Impact of 
Russian Sanctions on Commercial Arbitration in Asia’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 30 April 2015) 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/04/30/when-the-east-meets-the-far-east-the-impact-of-russian-sanctions-
on-commercial-arbitration-in-asia/> accessed 15 October 2015. 
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sanctions are very limited in scope and to confirm their continued neutrality.107 The 
debate has not been lost on jurisdictions and arbitral institutions seeking to attract 
arbitral business from Russian clients.108 Yet, beyond the practical, the imposition of 
economic sanctions (particularly by the EU) and the position of several European 
governments, particularly vis à vis Russia, have caused considerable debate within the 
arbitral community and specifically relating to the role of arbitral institutions. The 
debate above is illustrative of two interconnected points. The first point concerns 
economics. International arbitration is in one sense a sophisticated global marketplace 
for services. One aspect of this market is the competition between arbitral institutions 
and jurisdictions (as well as lawyers, law firms and arbitrators) for business. 
Economic sanctions appear to have had effects, or at least perceived effects, upon the 
operation of this market. The second point relates to politics. Economic sanctions are 
a direct consequence of wider geopolitical disputes and conflicts. The question arising 
from the discussion above is an important one, namely whether arbitral institutions 
and arbitrators can remain neutral and also be perceived as neutral in the context of 
such conflicts.109 This is of course more than simply an economic question for the 
individuals and institutions concerned but a core question for the institution of 
arbitration itself and its legitimacy. 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to examine how international economic sanctions interact 
with and impact upon the process of international arbitration. As shown, there are 
indeed many aspects to this interaction. 
 
We have considered some of the legal issues which flow from the applicability of 
sanctions regimes in arbitration, such as whether the applicability of economic 
sanctions can render disputes inarbitrable or deprive tribunals of jurisdiction. We have 
concluded that it is likely that arbitral tribunals will find that the presence of a 
sanctions regime will not render the dispute inarbitrable. Yet we have exercised 
caution, since the arbitrability of disputes falling under international sanctions largely 
depends on the law of the seat of the arbitration and the law governing the arbitration 
clause and on the interpretation of the particular wording of sanction regimes. The 
chapter has also considered the debate on whether particular sanctions may constitute 
rules of national or transnational public policy110 and accordingly the circumstances 
where the application of economic sanctions could render arbitral awards 
																																																								
107 ICC, LCIA and SCC, ‘The Potential Impact of the EU Sanctions Against Russia on International Arbitration 
Administered by EU-based Institutions’ (17 June 2015) <http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/80988/legal-insight-
icc_lcia_scc-on-sanctions_17-june-2015.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015. 
108 Olga Boltenko, ‘Hong Kong Emerges as Russia’s Refuge while the EU’s Sanctions Cripple Major Russian 
Businesses’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 24 November 2014) <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/11/24/hong-
kong-emerges-as-russias-refuge-while-the-eus-sanctions-cripple-major-russian-businesses/> accessed 15 October 
2015; Justin D’Agostino, Brenda Horrigan and Rebecca Soquier, ‘When the East Meets the Far East: the Impact of 
Russian Sanctions on Commercial Arbitration in Asia’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 30 April 2015) 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/04/30/when-the-east-meets-the-far-east-the-impact-of-russian-sanctions-
on-commercial-arbitration-in-asia/> accessed 15 October 2015. 
109 ICC, LCIA and SCC, ‘The Potential Impact of the EU Sanctions Against Russia on International Arbitration 
Administered by EU-based Institutions’ (17 June 2015) <http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/80988/legal-insight-
icc_lcia_scc-on-sanctions_17-june-2015.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015; ICC, ‘The merchants of peace’ 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/history/> accessed 15 October 2015. 
110 Elliott Geisinger, Philippe Bartsch, Julie Raneda and Solomon Ebere, ‘Les conséquences des sanctions 
économiques sur les obligations contractuelles et l'arbitrage’, (2012) Int'l Bus LJ 405, 424; Geneviève Burdeau, 
‘Les embargos multilatéraux et unilatéraux et leur incidence sur l'arbitrage commercial international - Les états 
dans le contentieux économique international, I. Le contentieux arbitral’ (2003) 3 Revue de l'Arbitrage 753, 764. 
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unenforceable on public policy grounds. 111  It is difficult to draw any definite 
conclusions as to the possibility of refusing recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award based on the public policy or non arbitrability grounds of the New York 
Convention. The specific features of the award, the nature of the sanctions regime in 
place, and of course the interpretation of the public policy / non arbitrability 
exceptions by the enforcing jurisdiction will need to be considered in any given case. 
Based on the available case-law, a refusal to enforce is likely only where clear and 
direct breach of the sanctions regime in place in the enforcing jurisdiction has been 
established. This has not occurred much in practice.  
 
From a more practical perspective, this chapter has analysed the growing discussion 
about the implications of sanctions regimes on arbitrators and arbitral institutions. We 
have noted that arbitrators will be personally bound by the provisions of sanctions 
imposed, and will need to give consideration to regimes in place in their home States 
and at the seat of arbitration as well as, more controversially, potentially applicable 
third state regimes. In this respect, international arbitrators would be expected to do 
basic due diligence to ensure compliance with applicable measures and should not 
assume they would be excused for any breach on the basis that they had not been 
aware of information made publically available by the relevant authorities. While 
carve-out provisions may well authorize individuals acting as an arbitrator in an 
international case, the arbitrators are often required to apply to the competent 
authorities for an exemption in order to accept appointments and should do so unless 
there is a clear authorization in place permitting arbitral appointments. Similar 
considerations apply to arbitration institutions. As ‘entities’ organized under the laws 
of certain jurisdictions and doing business there, they are bound by the sanctions 
regimes in place in their home jurisdictions and must therefore perform similar acts of 
due diligence, compliance and reporting as do arbitrators before accepting cases onto 
their books or accepting monies (such as advances on fees and costs) from disputing 
parties. The sensitive area of arbitral appointments by institutions has been further 
complicated by sanctions issues and this is an area in which institutions may well 
wish to work to develop and improve compliance procedures.  
 
In summary the impact of economic sanctions upon arbitration is marked. The legal 
issues presented by sanctions highlight many of the complexities inherent in 
international dispute resolution (perhaps more accentuated in international arbitration) 
following the complex interaction between domestic, regional and international legal 
norms. On a more practical level economic sanctions have given rise to issues of 
compliance by international arbitrators with a range of regulatory measures of a 
national, regional and international nature. There is little, if any, regulatory and 
professional guidance available to the nascent professional community of 
international arbitrators on these issues. Finally, sanctions have highlighted some 
issues concerning the role of arbitral institutions, specifically the competition among 
institutions for arbitral business, the extent of institutions’ obligations to comply with 
sanctions regimes and perhaps the lack of public guidance as to their compliance 
procedures.  
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